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Federal Estate Tax: A Possible Exception in the 
Application of I.R.C. Section 2041 to Testamentary 
Powers of Appointment Held by Incompetent 
Decedents 
Under section 2041 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 
property subject to a post-1942l power of appointment, exercis- 
able in favor of a decedent or her2 estate, will be included- 
whether exercised or not-in the taxable estate of the decedent 
who "has" the power a t  death.3 Ambiguity in the terms of 
section 2041 opens a potential for inequitable results when the 
section is applied to tax the estates of passive donees of testamen- 
tary, general powers of appointment who are suffering from per- 
manent mental incompetency which, under state law,4 prevents 
them from exercising the power. Where the donee of a testamen- 
tary power is incompetent throughout the duration of the power's 
e~is tence,~ it is questionable whether the power is "exercisable" 
and whether the donee, in fact, possesses the power, as required 
by the section. A study of cases deciding related problems helps 
to define the issue, while a correlation of applicable legislative 
and administrative pronouncements with relevant constitutional 
language and policy considerations exposes the counterbalancing 
that will be necessary to finally resolve it. 
Although the specific issue under discussion has not been 
satisfactorily resolved by the courts, opinions related to peri- 
pheral problems have revealed the judiciary's limited sympathies 
for incompetent decedents. In the first of such cases, Hurd v. 
1. See text accompanying note 48 infra. 
2. As a consequence of the marital deduction, donees are most frequently women; this 
Comment will use feminine pronouns to refer to them. 
3. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2), (b)(l). For history, background, and general information re- 
garding powers of appointment, see Allen, Use of Trusts and Powers of Appointment in 
Estate Planning, 21 ARK. L. REV. 15 (1967); Picket, Powers of Appointment as an Estate 
Planning Tool, 26 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 1435 (1968). 
4. See notes 37-41 infra. 
5. The fundamental question may be whether under the circumstances focused upon 
by this Comment a power of appointment can be said to exist a t  all, rather than whether 
the power is excercisable, possessed, or vested. For lack of a better word, however, powers 
will be described throughout as existing. 
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Commi~sioner,~ decided in 1947, the decedent created a trust and 
appointed himself cotrustee. As trustee, he had the power to elim- 
inate the share of a beneficiary.' The decedent did not resign, was 
not removed, and was not adjudicated insane, although he was 
incompetent for eighteen months prior to his death. The court 
held that the trust was properly included in his estate because 
"the power existed in his behalfs . . . and he could have been 
removedM9 as trustee under the terms of the instrument. 
Seventeen years later in Round v. Commissioner, lo the dece- 
dent had established three trusts and retained a taxable power 
in each." The instruments provided that upon the decedent's 
incapacity, the corporate cotrustee would become the sole fidu- 
ciary.I2 Although the decedent had had a conservator appointed 
to manage his affairs, the court refused to remove the trust prop- 
erty from his taxable estate. The court interpreted the instru- 
ments as requiring permanent incapacity and found that in the 
absence of a permanent removal-i.e., an adjudication of insan- 
ity-the appointment of a conservator "was not the definitive act 
called for" by Hurd and did not remove the possibility that the 
decedent could have recovered and resumed his duties as cotrus- 
tee.13 
The decedent in Commissioner v. Noel," the only related 
United States Supreme Court case, retained a taxable power to 
designate the beneficiaries of two insurance policies purchased 
just prior to takeoff on his fatal airplane flight.15 The Court ad- 
mitted the practical impossibility of exercising the power while 
the decedent was in the air but declared it would not allow a 
decedent's "fluctuating, day-by-day, hour-by-hour capacity" to 
determine his tax liability: "Estate tax liability . . . depends on 
6. 160 F.2d 610 (1st Cir. 1947). 
7. Taxation of the property subject to this power was predicated upon Int. Rev. Code 
of 1939, ch. 1, 8 811(d)(2), 53 Stat. 121 (now I.R.C. $ 2038(a)). 
8. Under most state laws, a guardian can exercise an inter vivos power on behalf of a 
ward. See notes 40-41 infra. 
The term "guardian" will be treated in this Comment as synonymous with the terms 
"conservator," "curator," "tutor," and "approval of the court." See generally F. LINDMAN 
& D. MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 225 (1961). 
9. 160 F.2d at 613. 
10. 332 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1964). 
11. Taxation of the property subject to this power was predicated upon I.R.C. §§ 
2036(a) and 2038(a)(2). Id. at 595-96. 
12. Id. at 591. 
13. Id. at 593. 
14. 380 U.S. 678 (1965). 
15. Taxation of the property subject to this power was predicated upon I.R.C. § 
2042(2). Id. a t  678. 
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a general, legal power to exercise ownership, without regard to the 
owner's ability to exercise it at a particular moment."16 
An inter vivos power of appointment was involved in Estate 
of Rebecca Edelman.17 In this case, the Tax Court stressed the 
fact that the decedent had not been made a legal ward nor adjudi- 
cated incompetent. Under such circumstances, state case law 
provided that an exercise of an inter vivos power by an incompe- 
tent would only be voidable, not void? As a result, Mrs. Edelman 
retained at death a "valuable property right"l9 which the court 
held was properly subject to taxation. 
Townsend v. United Statesz0 also involved an inter vivos 
power of appointment. The decedent received the power in her 
husband's will but was unable, physically and mentally, to exer- 
cise the power before her own death. The plaintiff contended that 
the decedent's incompetency prevented her from "possessing" a 
taxable power.21 The court, in dicta, rejected this argument by 
stating that "it is immaterial under the provisions of [section 
2041(a)(2)] whether [the decedent] was . . . mentally capable 
of exercising such power."22 The court went on to exclude the 
property subject to the power from the estate because the donor's 
will had not been probated before the donee's death.23 
The Fifth Circuit in Estate of Bagley v. United Statesz4 re- 
fused to exclude a testamentary power of appointment from the 
taxable estate of a donee who died in a common disaster with the 
donor. The dissent vigorously opposed "[tlhis inequitable re- 
sult,"% alleging it was "not only inconsistent with the rationale 
of federal estate taxation, but unjust and a deprivation of prop- 
erty without due process of law."26 
The clearest comments on the subject were made by the 
16. Id. at 684. 
38 T.C. 972 (1962). 
Id. at 978 (citing Finch v. Goldstein, 245 N.Y. 300, 157 N.E. 146 (1927)). 
Id. 
232 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Tex. 1964). 
Id. at 221. 
Id. 
. The court interpreted state law as requiring a devised estate to vest immediately 
upon death. It concluded, however, that a power of appointment was not' an estate but a 
personal privilege that would not exist until probate. Id. at 222. State laws in other 
jurisdictions have not been interpreted to require this result. See, e.g., Estate of Bagley 
v. United States, 443 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1971) (construing Florida law); Jenkins v. United 
States, 428 F.2d 538 (5th Cir.) (construing Georgia law), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970). 
24. 443 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1971). 
25. Id. at 1270 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting). 
26. Id. at 1271 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting). 
6441 POWERS OF APPOINTMENT 647 
Ninth Circuit in Fish v. United States;27 the most direct discus- 
sion has been by a federal district court in Finley v. United 
States.28 These two cases, however, produced conflicting results. 
In Fish, the decedent had the power to demand on a yearly basis 
the income from a trust. She never exercised or released this 
power. The Internal Revenue Service included the value of the 
income in the taxable estate under the lapse provisions of section 
2041.29 Although so urged by the plaintiff, the court refused to 
address itself to the questions of whether the decedent was incom- 
petent or whether the power could have been exercised by a 
guardian. The court held that it was "immaterial whether the 
lapse occurred through a designed failure . . . or through indiffer- 
ence or incompetency of the decedent."30 
In the startling 1975 Finley decision, the court declared that 
the decedent who was incompetent throughout the existence of 
the power, though never officially so adjudicated nor subjected to 
a guardian, could not be deemed to have possessed the testamen- 
tary power of appointment a t  her death.31 The opinion, unfortun- 
ately, reads as though the court were unaware that it had come 
to a novel conclusion. The court recognized its conflict with the 
Ninth Circuit as expressed in Fish, but it claimed that Hurd, 
Noel, and Bagley provided sufficient support.32 The court con- 
cluded that the decedent's incapacity was distinguishable from 
that of the decedents in Hurd, Noel, and Bagley. The decedent 
in Finley could not have validly exercised the power, either alone 
or through a guardian. Her incapacity was "legal,"33 not fluctuat- 
ing, temporary, or brief; i t  was not merely physical or situa- 
ti0na1.~~ 
The decision in Finley may not have been as contrary to 
precedent as it first appears. Although not specifically discussed 
27. 432 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1970). 
28. 404 F. Supp. 200 (S.D. Fla. 1975), appeal dismissed, No. 76-1459 (5th Cir. May 
24, 1976). 
29. 432 F.2d a t  1279-80. 
30. Id. a t  1280. 
31. 404 F. Supp. a t  204. 
32. Id. at  202-03 n.2. 
33. By way of a footnote, the Tax Court in Estate of Freeman v. Commissioner, 67 
T.C. 202 (1976), suggested that Finley could be distinguished from prior cases on the 
grounds that it involved a legal rather than some other disability. Id. a t  208 n.9. Presuma- 
bly, the court felt that the disability in Finley was not simply physical or even mental. 
The difference between a legal disability and a mere physical or mental one has never been 
fully explored. It  could be that a physical disability, as well as one based upon situation, 
is both entirely an individual matter and one which theoretically could be overcome. On 
the other hand, a legal disability is imposed by law and is subject to uniform application. 
34. 404 F. Supp. at 204. 
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by the court, the facts, as revealed by the briefs, approach the 
fact situation suggested above35 in which taxation under the 
terms of section 2041 would seem most unwarranted. The dece- 
dent, Mrs. Whitlock, was mentally incompetent at all times dur- 
ing the existence of the power. She had no opportunity, not even 
a limited opportunity, to exercise the power. The decedents in 
Hurd, Edelman, and Fish each had some time in which they 
could have exercised the power.36 Even Mr. Noel had a few hours 
on the plane and Mrs. Bagley a theoretical second in which his 
or her power could have been exercised. 
Not only was Mrs. Whitlock incompetent throughout the 
duration of the power, but she also enjoyed no ownership rights 
over the property prior to the creation of the power by her hus- 
band's will. In Hurd and Round, the decedents themselves exe- 
cuted the trust instruments creating their powers; moreover, the 
property had been owned outright by them prior to its being 
placed in trust. 
Another distinguishing fact is that any attempt by Mrs. Whi- 
tlock to exercise her power would have been void, not just voida- 
ble. Her power was exercisable only by will, and lack of capacity 
renders a will void.37 On the other hand, under most state laws 
an inter vivos power can still be successfully exercised regardless 
of capacity, assuming the exercise is not later di~clairned.~~ It was 
upon this distinction that the decision in Edelman was based.39 
Finally, Mrs. Whitlock's power, being testamentary, could 
not have been exercised by a guardian acting in her behalf.'O A 
guardian's function is to manage the ward's property during life, 
not to control its disposition at death." 
A case for the exclusion of the appointive property from a 
35. See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra. 
36. In Hurd, the decedent was competent for nearly four years during the existence 
of the power. 160 F.2d at 611. In Edelman, the decedent was competent for three and one- 
half years. 38 T.C. a t  974. In Fish, the decedent was competent for two years during the 
existence of the power. 432 F.2d at 1279-80. 
37. R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER, & H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL IMPAIRMENT AND LEGAL 
INCOMPETENCY 286 (1968). 
38. Finch v. Goldstein, 245 N.Y. 300, 157 N.E. 146 (1927); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY 
Q 345 (1936). 
39. 38 T.C. 972, 978 (1962). 
40. Equitable Trust Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank, 25 Del. Ch. 281, 18 A.2d 228 (1941); 
Minnehan v. Minnehan, 336 Mass. 668, 147 N.E.2d 533 (1958). Cf. City Bank Farmers 
Trust Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594 (1945) (dealing with guardian's ability to exercise 
an inter vivos power); In re Houghton's Estate, 118 Vt. 228, 105 A.2d 257 (1954) (dealing 
with guardian's ability to exercise an inter vivos power). 
41. R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER, & H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 37, a t  283. 
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decedent's estate would be even stronger if several additional 
facts could be established. For instance, if a decedent was incom- 
petent at the time the donor's will which created the power was 
drawn, it could be argued that the donee (1) could not have 
agreed to the donor's plan for the pr~perty, '~ (2) could not have 
approved the donor's chosen takers-in-default, and (3) could not 
have changed her will to exercise the power. Before now, cases 
have just considered the decedent's incompetency after the power 
had been put into effect by the donor's death. Moreover, if such 
a decedent had attempted an inter vivos exercise of the power or 
had attempted to execute a will exercising it, a court may be more 
easily persuaded that taxation would be unwarranted. An official 
adjudication of insanity or the appointment of a guardian may 
also affect the result.43 
Although the present weight of precedent leans heavily in 
favor of taxation in the type of case here postulated, it is by no 
means clear that taxation is required in every instance.'' There 
42. For the view that the fact a decedent did not request a gift of the property in 
question "in no way affects the outcome" of tax disputes, see Peoples Trust Co. v. United 
States, 412 F.2d 1156 n.5 (3d Cir. 1969). Presumably, a donee who has no capacity to 
exercise a power is also rendered unable to disclaim it. See I.R.C. Q 2518(b)(2) (granting 
a minor nine months following his attainment of legal capacity to disclaim powers given 
to him). It may be possible for a guardian to disclaim a testamentary power if the facts 
establish that the disclaimer will not alter the succession of the property, see Minnehan 
v. Minnehan, 336 Mass. 668,671, 147 N.E.2d 533,535-36 (1958), and that the ward would 
have disclaimed the power himself if competent. See City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. 
McGowan, 323 U.S. 594, 598 (1945). The authority of a guardian, even with court ap- 
proval, is still doubtful in most jurisdictions, however, because a showing of benefit accru- 
ing directly to the ward is usually required before the guardian is allowed to dispose of or 
alter property. For a thorough discussion of the problem, see Fratcher, Powers and Duties 
of Guardians of Property, 45 IOWA L. REV. 264, 315, 317-18 (1960). 
43. See Round v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 590,594 (1st Cir. 1964); Estate of Rebecca 
Edelman, 38 T.C. 972, 978 (1962); Rev. Rul. 55-518, 1955-2 C.B. 384, 385. 
The outcome of a pending case in the District Court of the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Bank & Trust v. United States, No. 76-155 (W.D. Pa., filed 
Feb. 2, 1976), may provide additional insight into the importance of various fact combina- 
tions. In that case the decedent, Mrs. Brice, was alleged to have been hopelessly and 
incurably incompetent beginning six years prior to the donor's death and continuing until 
her own death. Following the donor's death, she was adjudicated incompetent and a 
guardian was appointed. The plaintiff claims that this incompetency prevented the dece- 
dent from possessing a taxable power of appointment. A will executed by Mrs. Brice ten 
years before her death and two years before becoming incompetent, however, evidences a 
calculated release of the power. The will states: "It is not my intention to exercise by any 
of the provisions of this Will any Power of Appointment which I may have under the Will 
of my husband, James W. Brice, or any Power of Appointment which I may have." 
Further, i t  would appear that the decedent's guardian could have exercised the power 
during Mrs. Brice's lifetime since it included an inter vivos power to consume. 
44. A case subsequent to Finley dealing with an analogous problem has failed to 
resolve the Finley question whether there may be an exception to the application of Q 2041. 
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are gaps between the cases which have not been fully addressed. 
The contours of this unresolved issue are not yet defined. 
Specifically how the gaps in present law will be, or should be, 
filled is a matter of some dispute. Reference to the legislative 
history of section 2041, the interrelation of that section to other 
sections of the Code, applicable rulings and regulations, certain 
constitutional language, and policy considerations provide a basis 
for analysis of the conflicting views. 
A. Legislative History 
The 1942 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 
made it clear that Congress was not unaware of the problem of 
donees under legal disabilities. The amendments included, for 
the first time, unexercised powers of appointment in the taxable 
estate unless "the donee of such power is under a legal disability 
to release such power, until six months after the termination of 
such legal di~abil i ty."~~ The Senate Report accompanying the Act 
summarized this provision, stating that the amendments would 
be "inapplicable to an existing general power held by a person 
under legal d i~abi l i ty ."~~ It is obvious from this language that 
incompetent donees can hold or possess powers of appointment; 
otherwise, the specific exclusion of these powers from the scope 
of the statute would not have been necessary. Since Congress 
could have excluded powers held by incompetent donees in the 
current version of the statute, the fact that it did not may indi- 
cate a present intent to tax these powers. 
In 1951, Congress enacted the Powers of Appointment Act4' 
for the express purpose of simplifying the treatment of powers 
created prior to 1942. Under the old law, an unexercised pre-1942 
power was subject to some complicated exceptions, including the 
Estate of Freeman v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 202 (1976). In Freeman, the court observed: 
"Regardless of how we might be disposed to treat a situation wherein a disability pre- 
cluded a decedent donee from exercising a general power of appointment, under tte 
circumstances of this case we fail to see how any 'disability' existed. . . ." Id. a t  208 
(footnote omitted). 
45. Revenue Act of 1942, § 403(d)(2), ch. 619, 56 Stat. 798,944 (1942) (amending Int. 
Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 811(d)(2), 53 Stat. 121). This provision regarding legal dis- 
ability does not appear to have been repealed and has been partially codified into 4 
2O4l(a)(l) (B) (ii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 
46. S. REP. NO. 1631, Pt. 2, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1942). 
47. Powers of Appointment Act of 1951, 4 2(a), ch. 165, 65 Stat. 91, 92 (1951). 
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exception for persons under legal disability mentioned above. 
After the change, pre-1942 powers were only taxed if exercised, 
although post-1942 powers continued to be taxed whether exer- 
cised or not.48 The evils flowing from the old law were described 
in the Senate Report accompanying the Act: "[Mlany such pow- 
ers [were not] discovered until it [was] too late for the donees 
to do anything about them. . . . [Tax revenues came] from the 
unwary or those who [were] powerless to help themse l~es . "~~  The 
Report, however, went on to approve the treatment of post-1942 
powers even though incompetent donees of post-1942 testamen- 
tary powers are by definition "unwary" and by state law 
"powerless to help themsel~es ."~~ 
B. Marital Deduction 
A thorough examination of the interplay between the marital 
deductions1 and powers of appointment is also useful in assessing 
the likely resolution of this issue. The purpose of the marital 
deduction was to equalize the incidence of estate tax in com- 
munity property and common law  jurisdiction^.^^ In community 
- 
48. The rationale for taxing an unexercised power was explained by the dissent in 
Bagley, 443 F.2d at 1271 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting): "A decedent who has knowingly 
permitted such a power to lapse a t  his death has exercised the privilege of directing the 
course of the property subject to it, as surely as if he had taken the formal steps necessary 
to exercise the power itself." Another commentator has described a taxable unexercised 
power as a power which the holder "refrains from exercising." Allen, supra note 3, at 17. 
The degree of volition necessary is an interesting question. In a case concerning a pre- 
1942 power (where exercise is a prerequisite to taxation), the court refused to hold that 
the decedent had exercised the power when his attempt was a "complete nullity which 
from its very inception was devoid of legal significance." Estate of Edith Wilson Paul, 16 
T.C. 743, 749 (1951). This is true, the court reasoned, especially when the attempt was 
nullified not just by a unique local law but also by the law in numerous common law 
jurisdictions. If an attempt by an incompetent or his guardian would not be an exercise 
of the power, it follows that inaction in such circumstances would not equal a forbearance 
from such exercising. 
49. S. REP. NO. 382, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [I9511 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 1530, 1531. 
50. Courts have demonstrated a tendency to be unsympathetic with the "unwary," 
however. In Estate of Freeman v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 202 (1976), the Tax Court refused 
to exempt from taxation the value of trust property even though the decedent was totally 
unaware of his power to terminate the trust and withdraw the property. 
51. I.R.C. 4 2056. 
52. Northeastern Nat'l Bank v. United States, 387 U.S. 213, 219 (1967); United 
States v. Stapf, 375 U S .  118, 128-29 (1963). Excluding testamentary powers qualifying 
for the marital deduction in the donor's estate from the taxable estates of incompetent 
donees will not create a benefit in common law states greater than that allowed in com- 
munity property states. Since a surviving spouse receives community property outright 
and, if incompetent, may dispose of it in voidable transactions or through a guardian, 
there is no equivalent situation in community property states. 
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property states, the surviving spouse is entitled to one-half of the 
community property tax free." Using the marital deduction, a 
surviving spouse in a common law state can receive an amount 
of property equal to the larger of one-half of the decedent's estate 
or $250,000 without the imposition of a tax.54 To qualify for the 
marital deduction, property left to the spouse must be subject to 
her ultimate control.55 A general power of appointment trust is a 
device frequently used to qualify property for the marital deduc- 
tion without thrusting the burden of managing the property on 
the surviving spouse. In creating a power of appointment trust 
with the marital deduction in mind, the parties are usually will- 
ing to accept an inevitable tax on the donee's estate in order to 
avoid a tax on the donor's estate. Generally, the husband dies 
first, and his estate is much larger; absent the marital deduction, 
the progressive estate tax would impose a greater burden upon his 
estate than upon his wife's estate. Deferment of the tax also 
means the use of tax dollars in the interim and, frequently, a 
reduction in tax caused by depletion of the taxable property. 
The Internal Revenue Code does not state that section 2041 
(governing general powers of appointment) and section 2056 (gov- 
erning the marital deduction) are to be reciprocal in effect .56 How- 
ever, "Congress' intent to afford a liberal 'estate-splitting' possi- 
bility to married couples, where the deductible half of the dece- 
dent's estate would ultimately-if not consumed-be taxable in 
the estate of the survivor, is unmi~takable."~~ 
53. See generally W. BURBY, CASES ON COMMUNITY PROPERTY 309-11 (4th ed. 1955). 
54. I.R.C. § 2056(c)(l)(A). 
55. In order to qualify for the marital deduction, property must meet certain prere- 
quisites. For instance, the property interest devised must not be terminable. A general 
power of appointment is a special exception to the terminable interest rule. If the donee 
beneficiary of a trust has the right to all of the income, payable at least annually, and 
the right to appoint the principal to herself or her estate, the trust property will qualify 
for the marital deduction, absent some other factor. Treas. Reg. $ 20.2056(b)-1 (1958); 
Fisher & Kohl, The Present Status of Powers of Appointment, Including Their Utility and 
Limitations in the Marital Deduction, 24 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 381, 398 (1966). 
56. In fact, Treas. Reg. 4 20.2041-l(b)(2), T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 432, warns that no 
provision of 8 2041 should be construed to limit the application of another Code section 
or regulation. In Starrett v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 163 (1st Cir. 1955), appointive prop- 
erty that failed to qualify for the marital deduction was not exempted from a second tax 
in the donee's estate. The court refused to construe §§  2056 and 2041 as permitting only 
one tax on the property. Id. at 166. Accord, Peoples Trust Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 
1156, 1162-63 (3d Cir. 1969). Contra, Security-Peoples Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F. 
Supp. 40 (W.D. Pa. 1965); Strite v. McGinnes, 215 F. Supp. 513, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1963), 
aff'd, 330 F.2d 234 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 836 (1964). 
57. Northeastern Nat'l Bank v. United States, 387 U.S. 213, 221 (1967). Evidence of 
this congressional intent can be found in the Senate Report that accompanied the bill 
enacting the marital deduction. The Report described the deduction as applying in "such 
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If powers otherwise qualifying for the marital deduction in 
the donor's estate would escape taxation in the donee's estate 
should the donee become incompetent, the Service would, no 
doubt, take an interest in foreclosing the use of the marital deduc- 
tion in such circumstances. If the Service chose to deny the mari- 
tal deduction in the donor's estate whenever the donee was in- 
competent-either unable to exercise the power at all or without 
the help of a guardian-it could do so under the literal language 
of existing regulations. One of the specific prerequisites for the 
marital deduction stated in the regulations is that the power of 
appointment be exercisable by the surviving spouse "alone and 
in all events."58 At least one court has interpreted this language 
as precluding the use of the marital deduction when a guardian 
would be required to effectively exercise the power.5g 
An understanding of the marital deduction also provides use- 
ful insight into the intent of the parties in creating powers of 
appointment. This intent has significant bearing upon the equi- 
ties of individual cases. When estate plans are the product of the 
mutual efforts of a husband and wife, the takers-in-defaults0 
listed in the husband's will are probably the wife's choice as well. 
There is generally no incentive for her to exercise the power even 
if she were capable of doing so. If couples so intend, they should 
be able to plan for maximum tax benefit without fear that the use 
cases where the value of the property over which the surviving spouse has a power of 
appointment will (if not consumed) be subject to either the estate tax or the gift tax in 
the case of such surviving spouse." S. REP. NO. 1013, Pt. 1, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 
reprinted in [I9481 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1163, 1238. 
58. Treas. Reg. 4 20.2056(b)-5 (1958). 
59. Estate of Stockdick v. Phinney, 16 A.F.T.R.2d 6202 (S.D. Tex. 1965). One com- 
mentator has also suggested that "alone" means "presumably . . . without the approval 
of a court." Fisher & Kohl, supra note 55, a t  406. 
The Service has thus far refused to interpret the "alone and in all events" language 
of the regulation as precluding use of the marital deduction when the surviving spouse 
cannot exercise her power due to incompetency. Rev. Rul. 75-350, 1975-2 C.B. 367, states 
that "[tlhe phrase in all events does not refer to those events that State law has deter- 
mined to be sufficient to deprive a person of control of his or her property during a period 
of physical or mental incompetency." Id. at  368. The reason for this, as given by the ruling, 
is that anyone could possibly become incompetent a t  sometime; consequently, no power 
of appointment would ever qualify for the deduction. The allowance or denial of the 
marital deduction, however, must be predicated upon facts known at  the donor's death. 
See Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 508 (1964). Alternatively, a change in status 
of the donee within the statute of limitations could, if sufficiently permanent, be the basis 
for recomputing the tax. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 200, 201 (S.D. 
Fla. 1975), appeal dismissed, No. 76-1459 (5th Cir. May 24, 1976). 
60. "Takers-in-default" are the persons designated by the donor to receive the prop- 
erty after the donee's death if the power is not exercised by the donee. 
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of the marital deduction will be automatically precluded by the 
incompetency of the 
C .  Administrative Pronouncements 
1 .  Rulings 
Though congressional intent may be variously construed, the 
Service has left no doubt as to its view of when a decedent's estate 
should be taxed. In Revenue Ruling 55-518,62 the Service first 
announced its position that a decedent possessed a taxable power 
of appointment even though she was incompetent "at all times'' 
during the existence of the power.63 The ruling, however, dealt 
with an inter vivos power that was exercisable by the decedent 
with approval of the court. Although the ruling declared that 
taxation was predicated upon the existence of the power distin- 
guishable from the capacity to exercise it," the particular facts 
of the ruling imply a relationship to capacity because the power 
was still exercisable with approval of a court." 
Revenue Ruling 75-35066 is particularly on point. There the 
Service concluded that a testamentary power of appointment cre- 
ated in the husband's will is included in the wife's estate notwith- 
standing both her incompetency at all times during the existence 
of the power and her legal inability under state law to exercise it: 
"In the absence of a stated condition in the instrument requiring 
termination of the power of appointment, the practical inability 
of the wife to exercise it (due to her legal incapacity) did not 
affect the existence of the power at her death."67 
The Service suggests in Revenue Ruling 75-350 the compari- 
son between appointive property and property owned outright. 
The ruling correctly asserts that no form of incapacity exempts 
property owned outright from the throes of estate tax? It is, 
however, possible to distinguish property held outright and prop- 
- - - -- 
61. It has been suggested that the executor of the donee's estate be allowed to choose 
between taxation through application of 8 2041 to the donee's estate or through loss of 
the marital deduction in the donor's estate with the tax amount taken from the property 
in question. Comment, Estate Taxation: Powers of Appointment and Common Disasters 
IJnder Section 2041(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 23 U .  b. L. REV. 778, 
784 (1970). 
62. 1955-2 C.B. 384. 
63. Id. at 385. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra. 
66. 1975-2 C.B. 367. 
67. Id. at 368. 
68. Id. 
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erty subject to a testamentary power of appointment. First, the 
identity of the ultimate takers of the property owned outright is 
determined, if there is no valid testamentary document, by the 
laws of intestate succession. The decedent's blood relatives will 
generally receive the property. In the case of appointive property, 
however, the donor's will which created the power will frequently 
designate takers-in-default who might not bear the remotest rela- 
tionship to the decedent. Second, disposal of property owned out- 
right is not limited to testamentary disposition. Inter vivos trans- 
actions entered into by incompetents, such as contracts to sell or 
gifts, are generally only voidable. Further, such transactions can 
be validly completed by a guardian. Any attempted exercise of a 
testamentary power of appointment by or on behalf of an incom- 
petent would be totally ineffectual? 
2. Regulations 
While the regulations make no direct statement on the issue, 
they do provide useful insight into the necessary prerequisites for 
taxation. Although not readily apparent on an initial reading of 
the statute, not every general, vested, post-1942 power of appoint- 
ment "exists" for tax purposes. For instance, a power "by its 
terms" conditioned upon an event or contingency that did not in 
fact occur is not included in the taxable estate under the regula- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~  Powers subject to a binding agreement prohibiting their 
exercise are also not included." Consequently, the broad sweep- 
ing language of the statute cannot be taken literally. 
Of even greater significance is the fact that the statute has 
been interpreted not to tax a power invalidated by certain state 
laws.72 The courts as well as the regulations recognize that in 
some contexts an interest must be valid under state law before it 
can be subjected to federal estate tax. Although invalidation by 
state testamentary capacity and guardianship laws has never suf- 
69. See notes 37-41 supra. 
70. Treas. Reg. Q 20.2041-3(b) (1958). 
71. Estate of Cook v. Commissioner, 29 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 298, 300 (1970). 
72. C. LOWNDS, R. KRAMER, & J. MCCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT AXES § 12.11, 
at 316 (3d ed. 1974). The relationship between federal and state laws in this context was 
described in Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940): "State law creates legal 
interests and rights. The federal revenue acts designate what interests or rights, so cre- 
ated, shall be taxed." See also Rogers v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 410, 414 (1943). The 
extent and scope of property interests or powers is also determined by state law. Miller v. 
United States, 387 F.2d 866 (3d Cir. 1968); Picket, supra note 3, a t  1439-40. Local law 
will also affect a determination for marital deduction purposes. Treas. Reg. Q 20.2056(b)- 
5(e) (1958). 
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ficed to remove a power from taxation,73 it is arguable that it 
should. The dissenting opinion in Bagley somewhat reflected this 
analysis. In distinguishing a prior case, the dissent asserted: 
If, as a matter of state law, any document executed [by the 
donee] could have had no present or future legal effect, the 
Court would have had to conclude that [she] died without ever 
having had the privilege of disposing of the property, and hence 
that the value of the property could not be taxed to her estate.74 
D. Constitutional Language 
A constitutional look at the problem, framed in both direct 
tax and due process terms, has been suggested in several cases.75 
The Constitution prohibits a direct property tax levied without 
app~rtionment.'~ The estate tax is said to avoid this prohibition 
because it is an excise tax" levied on an action, privilege, or event 
rather than directly on the property. It has been argued that when 
the decedent is deprived of any possibility of control, the estate 
tax loses its excise quality and becomes a prohibited direct tax 
upon the appointive property.78 In recent times, courts have con- 
sistently rejected this direct tax arg~ment.~"hey have had no 
problem conceptualizing the estate tax as a levy upon the hap- 
73. The important question, under the current state of the law, is whether testamen- 
tary capacity and guardianship laws wipe a power out of existence or just prohibit its 
exercise. If it is the latter, the power is not invalidated, though nullified and, as such, 
could still be a taxable interest. Taxation would then be predicated on whether the federal 
statute is interpreted as taxing only viable powers. 
74. 443 F.2d 1266, 1271 (5th Cir. 1971) (Ainsworth, J., dissenting). 
75. In Finley, the court's holding obviated any need to address the constitutional 
argument raised by the plaintiff. 404 F. Supp. at 204 n.3. The plaintiffs failure to raise 
constitutional objections in a timely manner precluded judicial determination of them in 
Edelman, 38 T.C. at  978-79, and in Freeman, 67 T.C. a t  206 n.3. The majority in Bagley 
ignored the constitutional implications raised by the dissent. See 443 F.2d at  1271 (Ain- 
sworth, J., dissenting). 
A due process argument was briefly discussed in Jenkins v. United States, 428 F.2d 
538 (5th Cir. 1970). The court insisted that since the property interest vested in the donee 
at  the time of the donor's death, taxation of the property in the donee's estate was not a 
denial of due process even though the donee died seventeen days later. Id. a t  549-51. 
76. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2. 
77. C. LOWNDS, R. KRAMER, & J. MCCORD, supra note 72, 5 1.2, a t  2. See generally 
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 577 (1895) (citing Scholey v. Rew, 
90 U S .  331 (1874)). 
78. Brief for Plaintiff a t  2, Finley v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 200 (S.D. Fla. 1975). 
The estate tax is not infrequently described as a levy on a privilege. See, e.g., Estate of 
Rogers v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 410, 413 (1943); Jandoffs Estate v. Commissioner, 171 
F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1948). 
79. For a recent and clear denunciation of this argument, see Estate of Freeman v. 
Commissioner, 67 T.C. 202, 206-07 (1976). 
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pening of an event, namely death, or upon the receipt of the 
property by the survivor.80 
Another constitutional argument is that the donee's estate is, 
in effect, improperly taxed for the exercise of the donor's privi- 
lege. When the takers-in-default are designated in the donor's 
will and the donee cannot effectively appoint others, the donor is 
never divested of control over the property. The Supreme Court 
has invalidated a state income tax law that included a wife's 
income with the husband's for tax purposes, holding that "any 
attempt . . . to measure the tax on one person's property . . . by 
reference to the property . . . of another is contrary to due pro- 
cess of law."81 This argument again assumes that the basis of the 
estate tax is control by the decedent. If, however, the event of 
death or the maturation of the beneficiaries' interest accrues the 
tax, the argument fails. It would seem, though, that in such in- 
stances the tax should be extracted from the value of the property 
and not from the residual of the donee's estateY 
E. Policy Considerations 
When, as in this instance, the cases have left doubt as to 
what result would be required by law and that doubt is not elimi- 
nated by an examination of legislative history, related sections of 
the Code, rulings, regulations, or constitutional language, it is 
helpful to reduce the problem to policy terms. Considerations of 
judicial economy, ease of application, and fairness are especially 
relevant here. 
Courts are particularly sensitive to the administrative bur- 
dens suggested by making taxation turn on the competence of the 
decedent. In a footnote, the Fish court commented, "We note 
parenthetically that if the position contended for by the taxpayer 
were adopted, the result would be an open invitation to contest 
80. United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 363 US.  194, 198 (1960); Estate of 
Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 43 (1939); Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 
502-04 (1930); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41,57 (1900); Commissioner v. Clise, 122 F.2d 
998, 1001 (9th Cir. 1941). The tendency in these cases is to evaluate the tax from the point 
of view of the ultimate takers of the property. Their interest ripens at  the death of the 
previous owner regardless of her competency or her control over the property. Evaluating 
the tax from the position of the takers is not inappropriate. It  is they who can be made 
liable for the amount of the tax under I.R.C. 8 2207; the decedent is beyond the reach of 
the Internal Revenue Service at last. 
81. Hoeper v. Tax Comm'r, 284 US. 206, 215 (1931). 
82. I.R.C. tj 2207 allows the executor to require the takers of the property to pay the 
tax thereon "[u]nless the decedent directs otherwise in his will. . . ." Unfortunately, 
clauses providing for the payment of the estate taxes out of the residuary of the estate or 
some other fund are very common. 
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the competency of the decedent in every similar case. . . . "83 
Similarly, in Noel, the Supreme Court shunned the suggestion 
that tax law should be based on tenuous and fluctuating circum- 
s t a n c e ~ , ~ ~  possibly because such criteria would require extensive 
litigation. In Bagley, the court refused to tie taxation to the pro- 
bate of the donor's will possibly because the court interpreted 
congressional intent to mean that the delays and inconsistencies 
of probate also render it "so tenuous"85 a basis for taxation. 
One response to the argument of administrative convenience 
would be to limit special treatment to estates of decedents whose 
disability was not fluctuating but permanent throughout the pe- 
riod in question. Practical disability may well be too variable, 
short-term, and temporary to be the basis of taxation; legal disa- 
bility would be a more easily administered criterion. Of course, 
posthumously proving the lack of capacity necessary to establish 
legal disability could be most challenging? 
Another policy concern is that of simplicity of application. 
When i t  changed the treatment of pre-1942 powers, Congress 
stated that the treatment of post-1942 powers was already simple, 
clear-cut, and easy to apply." Although special treatment for 
incompetent decedents caught in the certain pattern of circum- 
stances described in this Comment would add one more compli- 
cation to the law, it would be far from the only complication that 
has been allowed under existing law. As discussed above,88 there 
are exceptions carved out for powers expressly subjected to con- 
tingencies, restricted by binding agreements, or invalidated by 
state law. 
Finally, it runs amiss of our sense of justice to tax the estate 
83. 432 F.2d at  1280 n.3. 
84. 380 U.S. 678, 684 (1965). 
85. 3 GA. L. REV. 766, 770 (1969). 
86. In the past, the Commissioner has been willing to stipulate to the decedent's 
incompetency, thus avoiding the problem of proving capacity. If the decision of the court 
could turn upon the decedent's competency, this spirit of cooperation would be dispelled. 
Some of the problems involved in proving capacity are illustrated in R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER, 
& H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 37. Appointment of a guardian, involuntary hospitalization, 
and determination of a contractual incapacity during the decedent's life are not conclusive 
of a lack of testamentary capacity. Id. at  253-54, 291. In recognition of these problems 
perhaps, the Louisiana Civil Code, art. 403, provides that the validity of acts cannot be 
contested after death on grounds of insanity unless the decedent's condition (1) was 
pronounced or an adjudication thereof petitioned while he lived, (2) was not manifest until 
ten days before his death, or (3) can be proved by the act itself. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 
403 (West 1952). 
87. S. REP. NO. 382, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [I9511 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 1530, 1531. 
88. See text accompanying notes 71-72 supra. 
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of a decedent for property from which she received no prior enjoy- 
mentag and over which she could exercise no control. The dissent 
in Bagley found it inequitable to tax property when there was no 
opportunity for the decedent to alter its dispo~ition.~~ The true 
injustice, however, does not lend itself to remedy through the tax 
laws. The husband's takers-in-default, not the persons desired by 
the decedent, obtain the property whether the decedent's estate 
is taxed for the property or not. If the tax amount is extracted 
from the value of the appointive property, the passage of the 
property through the estate causes little harm, particularly to the 
decedent. 
An exception to the strict application of section 2041 in cases 
involving permanently incompetent donees of testamentary pow- 
ers is arguably justified and may find acceptance in the courts. 
The weight of precedent favors taxation regardless of circumstan- 
ces, but no case besides Finley directly addresses these excep- 
tional facts. Congressional statements intimate a sympathy for 
unwary decedents and those under legal disabilities, but the 
wording of the statute contains no clear protection for them. The 
rulings insist upon taxation while the regulations, on the other 
hand, open a slim possibility for exception. Such an exception's 
appealing sense of fairness and justice is not well supported by 
specific constitutional mandates and must be weighed against 
the policies of administrative convenience and simplicity of ap- 
plication. The greatest concern of estate planners, though, is 
probably the effect such an exception would have on the use of 
the marital deduction. There is the chance that exclusion of ap- 
pointive property in donees' taxable estates will automatically 
trigger denial of the marital deduction in donors' estates, even 
though the use of the marital deduction would obtain a greater 
tax savings overall. Most importantly, though, those involved in 
the planning stages of estates should be aware of the possibility 
that an exception exists, the exact parameters of which are un- 
known .@I 
89. Of course, a power of appointment trust that qualifies for the marital deduction 
will include a right to the income of the trust payable at least annually. Unless the right 
to the income is allowed to lapse, the donee definitely receives a benefit from the property 
during her life. 
90. 443 F.2d at 1270-71 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting). 
91. Rev. Rul. 75-351,1975-2 C.B. 369, discusses the parallel problem of a minor donee 
of a power of appointment. According to the ruling, a minor's estate includes a testamen- 
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tary power of appointment although, by reason of local law, the minor was precluded from 
executing a valid will and thereby from exercising the power. The incapacity of a minor 
can only be distinguished from the facts treated by this Comment on the basis of perman- 
ence. In the rare but possible situation where the donor of the power had reason to know 
at  the time the power was drafted that the minor donee would never gain capacity-i.e., 
if he were suffering from a terminal illness-the equities bearing upon a decision to tax 
the minor's estate for the appointive property would follow those discussed herein. 
